The US-Russia-Ukraine negotiations: Architecture of tactical theatre and strategic deception
The road to a negotiated settlement between Ukraine and Russia still remains unclear. While representatives continue to meet in various formats, the core demands of both sides show little sign of changing. A frozen conflict scenario subsequently becomes a very real possibility.
Meting room in the presidential palace of Sheikh Mohammed Bin Zayed in Qasr Al Watan, Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates.
The Abu Dhabi negotiations were conducted simultaneously on two different and mainly contradictory levels, revealing fundamental asymmetries in the manner in which the involved parties conceptualize the diplomatic engagement. At the tactical level, Russia demonstrates engagement sufficient to satisfy Trump administration requirements while trying to position itself favourably in the international media. At the strategic level – where substantive resolution would require real compromise and recognition of Ukrainian vital interests – Moscow exhibits zero flexibility, transforming negotiations into a cognitive warfare instrument rather than a peace process.
Negotiations appear productive on procedural matters while remaining comprehensively deadlocked on existential questions. Russia’s delegation composition shift from diplomatic representatives to the military intelligence leadership such as Igor Kostyukov (GRU chief) leading negotiations opposite Ukraine’s Kyrylo Budanov (Chief of Presidential Office, formerly military intelligence head), signals Moscow’s tactical seriousness while simultaneously illuminating its strategic intentions. The presence of Kostyukov suggests that Russia perceives these discussions as operational planning sessions for favourable conflict termination rather than genuine peace negotiations recognizing Ukrainian statehood. The February 17th to 18th Geneva talks marked Russia’s return to diplomatic-political leadership, with Vladimir Medinsky signalling a shift toward even more manipulative political theatre.
The initial round of negotiations (January 23rd to 24th 2026) established this pattern. Productive engagement on prisoner exchanges, discussion on ceasefire mechanics, and humanitarian aspects were countered by absolute intransigence on territorial questions, Ukrainian sovereignty, and security guarantees. The Ukrainian delegation categorically rejected Russia’s territorial claims demanding the complete withdrawal of the armed forces from Donetsk Oblast territories currently controlled by Kyiv. These are conditions transparently designed to create a basis for future interventions.
The second round framework from February 4th to 5th follows the established pattern from the first round: the discussion of all 20 “Peace Plan” points at the expert level, the identification of disagreements, technical progress on secondary issues, and absolute deadlock on principal questions. Ukrainian sources indicate that the negotiations are structured around the Kushner principle: segregating “everything” from territorial matters, thereby addressing non-territorial issues initially while postponing sovereignty discussions. This creates the tactical appearance of progress (technical agreements on monitoring mechanisms, force disengagement procedures, humanitarian access) while the impossibility of a strategic resolution endures.
The third round of trilateral negotiations in Geneva (February 17th to 18th 2026) revealed deepening divergence between military-technical progress and the political stalemate. Zelenskyy expressed frustration post-Geneva, stating: “I don’t need historical shit to end this war and move to diplomacy. Because it’s just a delay tactic.” This suggests that Russian negotiators are focused on historical narratives rather than concrete settlement parameters.
Russia uses talks to pursue sanctions relief and business deals rather than genuine settlement. Moscow employs negotiations primarily to fracture western cohesion, buy time for economic adjustment, and military reconstitution, all while establishing a framework excluding European participation. Russia demonstratively violated the so-called “energy truce” through massive the February 2nd and 3rd attacks (timed to coincide with the NATO Secretary General’s Kyiv visit and the start of the Abu Dhabi talks), demonstrating contempt for de-escalation commitments while calculating that Ukraine cannot abandon negotiations without bearing blame for diplomatic failure. Overnight attacks on February 16th and 17th (immediately before the Geneva talks) and February 20th and 21st (immediately after) continued this pattern, with Russia launching combined drone and ballistic missile strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure and civilian targets while delegations were in Geneva, underscoring Moscow’s instrumental use of violence to apply pressure during diplomatic engagement.
The positioning of the Trump administration indicates a prioritization of perception over substantive engagement. Steve Witkoff coordinates his position directly with Putin’s economic envoy Kirill Dmitriev, thereby marginalizing institutional expertise while fostering a bilateral US-Russia dynamic that regards Ukraine as an object of negotiation rather than a sovereign participant. The January Dmitriev-Witkoff-Kushner-Grünbaum-Bessent meeting demonstrated Russian strategy: offering frozen asset utilization, Arctic resource access, and sanctions relief to secure American acquiescence for territorial consolidation and Ukrainian neutralization. Trump publicly pressured Ukraine before the Geneva talks, stating that “Ukraine better come to the table fast” when asked about negotiations. At the same time, he described the Geneva meeting as “big talks” – rhetoric showing the administration needs a settlement announcement ahead of the November 2026 congressional midterm elections over any settlement quality or Ukrainian sovereignty protection.
Why Russia does not want any compromise
Putin has no ability to stop the war because he needs the war to keep the “stability” of his political regime and the “price” for finishing war could be bigger than its continuation. Lavrov’s post-Abu Dhabi invocation of the December 2021 draft treaties – demanding NATO withdrawal from Eastern Europe and Alliance expansion prohibition, demonstrates Russia’s pattern of reintroducing maximalist demands after any partial concession. On February 11th, Lavrov effectively dismissed the US-Ukraine 20-point peace plan, claiming that during the Alaska summit in August Witkoff provided Moscow with a different document “in line with realities on the ground” that “opened a path to peace”. This suggests that Russia views any framework incorporating Ukrainian sovereignty protections as a European obstruction of any US-Russia bilateral accommodation.
Russia’s “de-Nazification” demands, requiring Ukrainian government composition changes, educational policy revision, Russian language status elevation, the restoration of the Russian Orthodox Church, and the removal of any “anti-Russian element” from territories “that will be called Ukraine”, shows its strategic objectives explicitly. Putin’s demand for Ukrainian elections specifically targets Zelenskyy’s removal, seeking a compliant leadership accepting subordinate status. The formulation of “territories that will be called Ukraine” eliminates any pretence regarding Russian recognition of the permanence of Ukrainian statehood.
Tactically, Russia uses the negotiations to achieve three immediate objectives. First (we should analyse it as part of an influence operation campaign), there is a desire for the fracturing of western cohesion through demonstrating Ukrainian intransigence, all while projecting Russian reasonableness. This explains the productive engagement on secondary issues (prisoner exchanges, humanitarian access) while maintaining absolute positions on sovereignty questions. Second, there is a need for time acquisition for economic adjustment, military reconstitution, and completing targeted infrastructure campaigns. The main goal here is to provide the ground for Trump to not impose more sanctions, etc. on Russia. Third, Moscow hopes to establish a negotiation framework excluding European participation while maximizing bilateral US-Russia accommodation. This will marginalize Ukrainian agency. The Geneva negotiations exposed European marginalization acutely. While British, French, German and Italian delegations attended Geneva for sidebar meetings with Ukrainian and US teams, they remained excluded from trilateral sessions.
Russia’s strategic vulnerabilities rarely penetrate public discourse but constrain Moscow’s freedom of action. The National Welfare Fund declined 57 per cent since the start of the invasion, while Russia’s customs revenues fell 20 per cent in 2025, etc. Energy sector underinvestment and technological lag (exacerbated by sanctions) have created medium-term production constraints. Russia’s defence expenditure exceeds six per cent of GDP, with the mobilization of 30,000 troops monthly sustaining operational tempo despite horrific casualties. The negotiations provide breathing space for industrial production, particularly as western sanctions prove ineffective.
Ukrainian positions
Ukraine’s negotiating position reflects a profound awareness of a deteriorating strategic landscape while maintaining a rhetorical commitment to territorial integrity. President Zelenskyy’s public rhetoric emphasizes territorial integrity and UN Charter principles, but the operational framework reveals significant flexibility underlying maximalist claims through the acknowledgment that current capabilities preclude comprehensive territorial recovery. The fundamental demand articulated by Ukraine revolves around security guarantees that would avert a resurgence of Russian aggression. Kyiv recognizes that any settlement leaving Russia militarily capable and politically motivated ensures renewed conflict.
Ukraine’s tactical aims within negotiations prioritize the preservation of process over immediate substantive outcomes.
First, maintaining the trilateral format rather than bilateral US-Russia negotiations excluding Ukraine explains Budanov’s negotiating team leadership and Arakhamia’s return, providing American communication channels and direct Russian contacts (there are even Abramovich connections from the Istanbul 2022 negotiations). The strategic weakness here for Ukraine is the absence of the EU at the negotiations.
The Geneva talks demonstrated this vulnerability acutely, with Umerov and Arakhamia conducting informal two-hour discussions with Russian counterparts after official sessions concluded—suggesting substantive bilateral Ukrainian-Russian exchanges occurring alongside a trilateral US-mediated framework, potentially creating multiple negotiation tracks with unclear coordination.
Second, there is a desire to establish conditionality linking Ukrainian concessions to enforceable security mechanisms rather than paper commitments.
Third, extending timelines is enabling continued western assistance and infrastructure reconstruction. The Financial Times reported that the Trump administration placed pressure on Zelenskyy to announce wartime presidential elections and a peace deal referendum on February 24th through Zelenskyy has resisted this timeline.
Fourth, the Trump administration should be prevented from taking unilateral decisions imposing settlement terms without Ukrainian consent – the primary risk given the Witkoff-Dmitriev coordination dynamic.
The systemic risk of the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ withdrawal from the Donetsk territories that Russia demands for the beginning of “real” peace talks extends far beyond immediate military consequences.
For Ukraine such withdrawal creates cascading crises:
Strategic – Russia gains advantageous positions for renewed offensives with shorter distances to operational objectives. Ukraine loses fortified positions, defence depth, and reaction time while Russia obtains space for deep echeloned defences without Ukrainian pressure.
Political /social – withdrawal without military defeat demoralizes the army and populations, creating internal tensions and a potential political crisis.
Long-term security – establishing a deferred war scenario with worse starting positions.
The talks in Geneva revealed continued Russian maximalism on territorial questions: Moscow demands the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ withdraw from the remaining 20 per cent of Donetsk Oblast that it does not control as a precondition for “peace talks”.
United States: transactional disengagement
The approach adopted by the Trump administration represents transactional “deal-making” that prioritizes a rapid settlement over strategic outcome quality. Witkoff’s coordination with Dmitriev – developing frameworks incorporating Russian demands (as it was presented in the 28-point peace plan), creates a bilateral dynamic marginalizing Ukrainian agency. The last (January 31st 2026) Dmitriev-Witkoff-Kushner-Grünbaum-Bessent meeting exposed the Russian strategy: offering frozen asset utilization, Arctic resource access, and sanctions relief.
American interests centre on extrication from indefinite commitment while claiming “peacemaker” credentials. Trump’s domestic political calculus views Ukraine as a Biden legacy issue draining resources from prioritized objectives (competition with China, border security, economic nationalism). Consequently, settlement terms matter less than settlement achievement, creating an incentive structure favouring Ukrainian concessions over Russian accountability.
The institutional stance of the United States displays greater sophistication yet remains constrained in its influence. Secretary of State Rubio, National Security Adviser Waltz, and, previously, Kellogg, have acknowledged the necessity of security guarantees and the perils associated with territorial concessions. Nevertheless, Trump’s personal diplomacy characterized by direct engagement with Putin and reliance on Witkoff circumvents institutional expertise. While Trump asserts that Ukraine remains a component of “the electoral strategy”, practical focus is redirected towards asserting influence in the Western Hemisphere and confronting challenges in the Middle East. This shift engenders a vulnerability for Ukraine, as it becomes a secondary concern within American political discourse, thereby increasing pressure for a swift settlement irrespective of the terms negotiated.
China: strategic patience and asymmetric gains
China’s role constitutes perhaps the most critical yet undervalued variable in this context. Foreign Minister Wang Yi’s July 2025 statement to EU officials that China cannot afford for Russia to lose the war in Ukraine, crystallizes Beijing’s strategic calculation.
Chinese interests are multifaceted. Economically, Russia’s isolation creates a dependency that enables favourable energy terms, market penetration, and resource access (rare earth development in Siberia, infrastructure projects). Militarily, Sino-Russian coordination intensifies through intelligence sharing, joint exercises, and technology transfer. Diplomatically, conflict validates the Chinese narrative regarding US hegemony and the necessity for a multipolar global order.
Long-term Chinese strategic calculations are centred on the architecture of the post-conflict landscape. A weakened but surviving Russia would occupy the role of a junior partner within a China-led Eurasian framework. The fractures between Europe and the United States regarding the management of the Ukrainian situation create opportunities for enhanced Chinese economic engagement and political influence.
Beijing’s optimal scenario entails a protracted and controlled conflict that leads to western exhaustion, Russian status as a junior partner within a Chinese-dominated Eurasian order, the exacerbation of European-US divisions facilitating enhanced Chinese economic penetration, and the establishment of a normalized precedent for territorial conquest that could be applicable to the Taiwan situation.
European Union: fragmentation amid commitment
European positions demonstrate rhetorical unity masking profound internal divisions. The assistance package for 2026-27 worth 90 billion euros represents a significant commitment but reveals implementation challenges: delayed adoption timelines, enhanced cooperation exclusions (the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia declining financial participation), and unresolved questions regarding Russian asset utilization. Moscow’s explicit demand to exclude EU High Representative Kaja Kallas from negotiations, coupled with explicit Russian opposition to Ukrainian EU accession, reveals Moscow’s strategy: isolate Ukraine through European exclusion while exploiting intra-European divisions.
European strategic interests are centred on preventing a Russian victory that establishes a hegemonic precedent, while avoiding an indefinite resource drain. Individual member state positions vary dramatically. The Baltic states and Poland advocate maximum support, viewing a Ukrainian defeat as an existential threat. France and Germany seek a negotiated settlement balancing Ukrainian sovereignty with Russian security concerns. Hungary openly opposes assistance, characterizing support as “war promotion”. Italy and Spain demonstrate limited commitment through minimal military contributions. The Geneva round again excluded formal EU participation, reinforcing the Russian strategy of isolating Ukraine from its principal political ally.
Potential development of the situation: negotiations and frontline
Battlefield dynamics will determine negotiating leverage more than diplomatic engagement. The negotiations’ trajectory suggests incremental process rather than any breakthrough achievement. Immediate outcomes likely centre on limited confidence-building measures: prisoner exchanges (continuing the Istanbul precedent from May and July 2025) and the establishment of a potential humanitarian corridor.
Putin cannot end the war because he requires permanent conflict for domestic legitimacy. Russian positions on territorial sovereignty, Ukrainian statehood permanence, “de-Nazification” demands, and security architecture prove non-negotiable, ensuring the impossibility of a settlement while deflecting blame onto Ukrainian “intransigence”. This cognitive warfare approach targets western audiences by demonstrating Russian engagement while targeting Ukrainian domestic audiences through infrastructure attacks and territorial consolidation. This approach also targets Trump specifically through Dmitriev’s transactional proposals (Arctic access, business deals, frozen asset arrangements), appealing to the administration’s commercial orientation.
The critical inflection point involves Ukrainian domestic stability and resilience. The latest opinion polls show that 52 per cent of respondents categorically reject the proposal to transfer the entire Donbas region to Russian control in exchange for security guarantees (with 40 per cent ready to accept). However, only 26 per cent of Ukrainians believe in the success of the peace negotiations with Russia.
The diplomatic process likely follows an extended timeline rather than any rapid resolution. Multiple negotiating tracks will emerge: US-Russia bilateral discussions (potentially a Trump-Putin summit), trilateral technical negotiations (the Abu Dhabi format continuation), and broader multilateral engagement (potentially involving EU, China and Turkey). This proliferation creates coordination challenges while providing opportunities for forum shopping and obstructionism.
The most probable outcome involves a disadvantageous Ukrainian settlement under US pressure, establishing a frozen conflict with inadequate security guarantees. This creates an unstable equilibrium: Russian territorial consolidation without international recognition, Ukrainian nominal independence without effective sovereignty, European security architecture damage without replacement, and renewed conflict probability within a three-to-five-year timeframe.
Alternative scenarios requiring either a Russian strategic defeat (militarily implausible) or western sustained commitment (politically unlikely) face significant implementation barriers. The political will for even a possible frozen conflict within a robust European security architecture remains currently absent.
The fundamental question remains unaddressed: how to achieve a durable settlement when Russia’s strategic objectives require the elimination of Ukrainian statehood, while Kyiv’s survival requires robust external security guarantees no participant proves willing to provide? The Geneva talks crystallized this core contradiction without resolving it.
Dr. Oleksii Polegkyi is an Assistant Professor at the Catholic University of Lublin and an Academic Director at the Centre for Public Diplomacy, Ukraine. He was an Adjunct at the Institute of Political Studies, Polish Academy of Sciences and a visiting researcher at the Digital Humanities Institute, EPFL in Switzerland, and the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, University of Alberta. He was also a MOFA research fellow at the National Chengchi University in Taiwan. He earned his PhD in Political Sciences from the University of Wrocław, Poland and the University of Antwerp, Belgium. His research interests include security dynamics in CEE, Ukrainian and Russian security and foreign policy, and media and disinformation.
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